Master of the Roster Doctrine in India

Master of the Roster (MoR) refers to the principle that the Chief Justice – whether of India (CJI) in the Supreme Court or a High Court – has exclusive authority to constitute benches and assign cases. In the Indian judiciary, the CJI is often called “first among equals”, reflecting that while the Chief Justice is an administrative head, he or she is judicially equal to other judges. This explainer breaks down the MoR doctrine for UPSC aspirants, covering its definition, constitutional basis, key case laws, scope, limitations, and comparative context, in a structured manner with key terms highlighted.

1. Definition and Core Concepts

Definition: The Master of the Roster doctrine means that the Chief Justice has the privilege and responsibility of allocating cases and forming benches in the court. In practice, no judge can hear or decide a case unless it has been assigned by the Chief Justice. This ensures a centralized system of case distribution in a multi-judge court.

 “First Among Equals”: On the judicial side, the CJI (or a High Court Chief Justice) is primus inter pares – first among equals. This means the Chief Justice’s vote or decision carries the same weight as any other judge on a bench. The Chief’s special role is administrative: as MoR, the Chief Justice controls the roster (schedule of cases and bench composition), but does not enjoy higher judicial authority over case outcomes.

 Operation in the Judiciary: In the Supreme Court of India, which often sits in multiple smaller benches, the MoR power of the CJI is crucial. The CJI decides which judges will sit together on benches and which matters each bench will hear. Similarly, in each High Court, the Chief Justice exercises roster control over division benches and single judges. This system has evolved as a matter of convention and internal procedure to ensure orderly functioning of courts.

2. Constitutional and Statutory Basis

The Constitution of India and related rules provide the framework (albeit indirectly) for the Master of the Roster:

• Article 124(1) – Establishes the Supreme Court with a Chief Justice of India and a prescribed number of other judges. By naming the office of Chief Justice, the Constitution envisages a leadership role at the apex of the judiciary. (Articles 217 and 223 similarly recognize Chief Justices in High Courts.)

• Article 145 – Empowers the Supreme Court to frame its own rules of procedure, including rules on bench strength and powers of single vs. division benches. Under Article 145(3), any substantial constitutional question must be heard by a bench of at least five judges, giving the CJI authority to convene larger benches when required. This Article is the basis for the Supreme Court Rules, which codify certain practices.

• Article 146(1) – Vests the administrative control of the Supreme Court’s staff in the Chief Justice. All appointments of court officers and servants are made by the CJI or someone he/she designates. This underpins the Chief Justice’s ability to supervise the Registry (which plays a key role in listing cases and managing the roster).

• Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – The Supreme Court’s procedural rules (framed under Article 145) explicitly reflect the MoR principle. For example, the Court’s Handbook on Procedure states that the Registrar prepares the roster “under the directions of the Chief Justice of India,” and all roster-related powers of the Registrar are subject to the CJI’s orders. In other words, the rules administratively acknowledge that the CJI decides how benches are arranged and cases allocated. These rules and norms have the effect of law within the court.

• Relevant Statutes and High Court Rules: High Courts have their own procedural rules (under Article 225) which generally affirm that the Chief Justice of the High Court controls bench formation and case assignment. For instance, in High Courts, rules often specify that certain cases (like public interest litigations or important matters) will be listed as per the directions of the Chief Justice.

Note: Nowhere does the Constitution explicitly use the term “master of the roster.” It is a doctrine derived from conventions, “healthy practice,” and judicial pronouncements over time. The Supreme Court has noted that the CJI’s role as MoR “is based upon healthy practice and sound conventions… developed over time and engrafted in the Supreme Court Rules”.

3. Major Case Law Pronouncements

Over the years, several landmark judgments have defined and clarified the Master of the Roster doctrine and the Chief Justice’s powers:

• State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (1998): A seminal Supreme Court decision concerning a High Court’s functioning. The Court held unequivocally that “the Chief Justice is the master of the roster” with the exclusive prerogative to constitute benches and allocate cases. It emphasized that in a High Court, administrative control vests in the Chief Justice alone, and puisne (other) judges cannot pick their own cases or alter bench compositions. This judgment arose after a Rajasthan High Court judge defied the Chief Justice’s assignments; the Supreme Court restored discipline by affirming the CJ’s sole authority in roster matters.

• Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms (CJAR) v. Union of India (2018): In this case (during a controversy involving allegations related to a case being heard by the Supreme Court), a Constitution Bench reaffirmed the MoR doctrine for the Supreme Court. The Bench explicitly applied the Prakash Chand principle, holding that what is true for a High Court CJ applies pari passu to the CJI – the Chief Justice of India alone has the power to allocate cases in the Supreme Court. Any order by any other judge attempting to assign cases was declared ineffective in law. The CJAR judgment thus cemented that the CJI’s administrative power cannot be bypassed, even if the CJI’s own conduct is in question.

• Asok Pande v. Supreme Court of India (2018): A public interest litigation filed by a lawyer sought to change the roster system by interpreting “Chief Justice” to mean a collegium of senior judges for case allocation. A three-judge Bench, however, strongly rejected this idea. Relying on convention and the Supreme Court Rules, the Court held that “‘Chief Justice in his individual capacity is the Master of the Roster’ and it cannot be read as a Collegium of three, five, or any other number of judges”. The Bench reaffirmed that the CJI’s administrative power to allocate business is exclusive and cannot be delegated to a group. It also noted that since the Supreme Court itself frames its rules under Article 145, the Court cannot by judicial fiat change those to alter the MoR structure.

• Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India (2018): In this petition, a veteran lawyer (and former Law Minister) challenged the concentration of roster power in one person and sought a more transparent, rule-based system (like collective allocation by the five senior-most judges). The Supreme Court bench appreciated the concerns but refused to dilute the CJI’s sole authority. It reiterated that while the CJI must exercise the power responsibly, **“the Chief Justice is the Master of the Roster” and that **allocation of cases is an administrative function flowing from convention, not a power that can be re-vested in a Collegium. The Court emphasized that involving a collegium for daily roster matters would be impractical and could “undermine the day-to-day functioning” of the courts. In sum, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the CJI alone would continue to decide the roster.

• Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra (2005): While not about roster per se, this Constitution Bench ruling on judicial discipline is often cited in the MoR context. It held that a Bench of co-equal strength cannot overrule or disregard the decision of another co-equal Bench; any disagreement with a prior precedent must be referred to a larger Bench. This “bench strength hierarchy” principle means smaller or coordinate Benches must defer to larger Benches’ decisions, ensuring consistency. The Dawoodi Bohra rule reinforces that the Chief Justice (as MoR) should constitute a larger Bench when a revision of precedent is needed, underlining the CJI’s role in maintaining judicial discipline through proper bench composition.

(Other cases: Inder Mani v. Matheshwari Prasad (SC 1996) and State of UP v. Neeraj Chaubey (SC 2010) similarly stressed that judges must abide by the roster fixed by the Chief Justice, to prevent “internal strife” or forum-shopping within the court. In Re: D.C. Saxena (1996), the Supreme Court even held that suggesting the CJI would abuse roster power to influence outcomes amounts to contempt of court, underscoring the expectation of fairness in the MoR system.)

 Key principle established: Across these judgments, the consistent principle is that **the Chief Justice (whether of India or a High Court) has exclusive administrative authority to decide who hears what case. This is considered essential for maintaining institutional order, integrity, and efficiency in court functioning.

4. Scope and Powers of the Chief Justice as MoR

As Master of the Roster, the Chief Justice wields extensive administrative powers in the judiciary. The scope of these powers includes:

• Constituting Benches: The Chief Justice decides the composition of benches – i.e. which judges will sit together to hear cases. This includes forming regular division benches (of two or three judges) as well as Constitution Benches of five or more judges for important questions of law. The CJI also selects which judges will be part of larger benches, taking into account factors like seniority, expertise, or workload. (For example, the CJI can constitute a five-judge bench to interpret the Constitution as required by Article 145(3).)

• Allocating Subject Matters: In the Supreme Court, cases are grouped by subject categories (e.g. criminal appeals, service matters, taxation, constitutional matters, etc.). The CJI assigns these categories to different benches through the roster. For instance, a roster may specify that Bench ‘A’ will hear all tax matters, Bench ‘B’ will hear all criminal matters, and so on. The Court’s Registry prepares a roster chart based on these directions. Multiple benches may be given the same category, and the Registry will list new cases before any of those benches as per availability. This subject-wise allocation ensures a systematic distribution of work.

• Listing and Scheduling of Cases: The Chief Justice (via the Registry) controls the daily cause list – which cases are listed for hearing on a given day, and before which bench. Crucially, the CJI has the power to decide when a case will be heard (or if it will be heard at all). For example, if a matter requires urgent attention, the CJI can direct it to be listed at the earliest, even out-of-turn. Conversely, the CJI could decline to list a case promptly – effectively delaying its hearing. This listing power is significant; indeed, it has been noted that a CJI could even choose to not list a particular case during his/her tenure if they so wished. (This was a criticism during one tenure when few constitutional matters were listed.) More recently, CJIs have made it a point to regularly list pending constitutional cases for hearing.

• Assignment of Specific Cases: While the general rule is to assign cases by subject category, the Chief Justice can individually direct specific important or sensitive cases to particular benches. Sensitive cases – e.g. those with large political or institutional ramifications – may be marked by the CJI to be heard by a bench deemed appropriate. By convention, if a case is extremely sensitive or involves the institution’s credibility, the CJI might choose to assign it to a bench of the five senior-most judges (including themselves) for greater authority, or take it up personally. The CJI also has the discretion to set up a larger bench than usual for such cases. In practice, the Registry flags sensitive cases to the CJI, and the CJI then decides whether to keep the matter with his own bench or allocate it to another bench of sufficient seniority.

• Judicial Discipline and Bench Strength: The Chief Justice ensures adherence to the “bench strength hierarchy” – constituting larger benches when previous precedents need reconsideration. For example, if two judges on a division bench feel that an earlier three-judge bench judgment needs re-examining, they cannot overrule it themselves; they must refer the issue to the CJI, who can then constitute a larger bench (five judges or more) to settle the law. This power to decide the size of bench needed for a case is a key aspect of the roster control and maintains consistency in law.

• Emergency/Urgent Matters: The CJI (or the Duty Chief Justice in High Courts) handles urgent listing requests. Advocates can “mention” urgent cases (such as a stay on an execution, or a time-sensitive matter) before the Chief Justice’s court in the morning. It is then the CJI’s prerogative to allow an early hearing or let the case follow the usual queue. This gatekeeping role filters truly urgent matters and prevents misuse of urgent listings.

• Administrative Supervision: Finally, as MoR, the Chief Justice oversees the Registry’s functioning in case allocation. The Supreme Court’s practice and procedure are such that the Registry implements the roster under CJI’s instructions. Any deviation or special arrangement (for example, if a case has to be transferred from one bench to another due to a judge’s absence or recusal) is done only with the CJI’s approval.

These powers together make the Chief Justice’s role pivotal in the judiciary’s day-to-day functioning. The MoR system is intended to promote efficiency (by balancing workload) and consistency (by channeling cases to appropriate benches). It also serves a disciplinary purpose, ensuring judges do not encroach on each other’s domain. However, as discussed next, this centralization is not without concerns and calls for checks.

 (Example: The Supreme Court Rules and handbook enumerate many of the CJI’s administrative duties. As MoR, the CJI even selects which judges sit on Constitution Benches that decide substantial legal questions, underscoring the influence of this role on important outcomes.)

5. Limitations and Checks on the Roster Power

While the Chief Justice’s roster power is broad, it is not unfettered in principle – there are both legal limitations and emerging normative checks aimed at preventing misuse:

• Constitutional Silent, Convention Driven: Legally, the MoR doctrine is a matter of convention rather than explicit constitutional command. As Justice A.K. Sikri observed, the Constitution is silent on the Chief Justice’s roster role, which instead “is based on healthy practice and sound convention” built over time. This means the exercise of this power relies heavily on the good faith and wisdom of the Chief Justice. Natural justice principles implicitly expect the CJI to act fairly and transparently when allocating cases. If a CJI were to act arbitrarily (e.g. consistently assigning certain matters to “preferred” judges), it would violate the spirit of impartiality inherent in judicial duty – even if there may be no easy legal remedy.

• Internal Judicial Checks: Within the court, collegial peer pressure can act as a check. A famous instance occurred in January 2018 when four senior Supreme Court judges held a press conference expressing concern that the then CJI was assigning “cases of far-reaching importance… selectively to benches of his preference without any rational basis”. This unprecedented move by the judges brought the issue to light and was essentially an appeal to the institution and public for corrective measures. Such internal critique is rare, but it underscores that other judges can question the CJI’s allocations if they feel judicial propriety is at stake (albeit through informal or extraordinary means, since the CJI’s administrative decisions are generally not legally appealable by brother judges).

• Transparency Measures: In response to concerns, the Supreme Court has taken steps towards greater transparency in roster publication. Now, the roster of subjects allocated to each bench is published by the Registry on the Supreme Court’s website. This allows the public and bar to see which types of cases each bench (by judge name) will hear during a particular period. While the CJI still decides the roster, making it public acts as a mild check – it discourages ad-hoc or last-minute changes that could invite suspicion. Moreover, speaking orders by benches are sometimes passed if a case needs to be transferred to a different bench for some reason, ensuring a recorded reason for change.

• Judicial Review: Can the roster decisions of a CJI be challenged in court? Generally, the Supreme Court has held that roster allocation is an internal administrative function of the Chief Justice, and not subject to judicial review, except perhaps in the most extraordinary cases. In the Shanti Bhushan PIL, the petitioner argued that unfettered power in one person was against democracy, but the Court refused to judicially curtail it – essentially leaving the matter to the judiciary’s internal mechanisms. Thus, a litigant cannot ordinarily approach court to challenge why their case was listed before Judge X and not Judge Y. The legal presumption is that the CJI, as an institution, will act bona fide in roster matters.

• Natural Justice and Recusal: A critical expectation is that the Chief Justice should not misuse the power to assign cases in which he or she has a personal interest. The principle nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in their own cause) serves as an implicit limitation. For instance, if allegations are made against the Chief Justice or the Chief Justice is a party in a matter, propriety demands that he/she not assign the case to a bench of personal preference or sit on it. Instead, another senior judge should handle those administrative decisions. In practice, however, this can be tricky – the Supreme Court in one controversy asserted that even if the CJI is involved in the matter, it is still the CJI’s prerogative to assign the case (and that insinuating the CJI would favor a friendly bench is contemptuous). This shows a tension between natural justice and MoR; the expectation is that the CJI will voluntarily recuse from any role in such cases to uphold impartiality, but formally the power remains with the office of CJI.

• Administrative Guidelines: Within the Supreme Court’s own framework, there are some guidelines to streamline roster use. For example, all pending cases of a particular category are supposed to be distributed as per the subject roster, and any deviation (say, tagging an out-of-category case to a bench) should be minimized. The CJI’s office also often consults senior judges or uses software to randomly allocate cases in a category to different benches to ensure fairness, especially after criticism. However, there is no written, statute-based procedure that strictly binds the CJI’s discretion in allocation– it largely operates on trust and established practice.

• Public and Scholarly Scrutiny: As a soft check, the legal community and civil society keep a close watch on roster outcomes. Any pattern that suggests bias (for example, important cases consistently going to certain judges) is quickly pointed out in media and academic commentary. This external scrutiny pressures the Chief Justice to exercise roster powers in a manner that appears fair and devoid of favoritism, to maintain the court’s credibility.

In summary, the MoR power is broad but balanced by constitutional conventions, the CJI’s own sense of duty, peer oversight, and transparency initiatives. The integrity of the Master of Roster system ultimately rests on the personal integrity of the Chief Justice and the norms developed by the judiciary itself. This has led to ongoing debates on whether more formal checks are needed – discussed further in section 10 on reforms.

6. Master of the Roster and Judicial Discipline

The roster system is intimately linked with judicial discipline and decorum. Several norms ensure that the power is used to uphold orderly adjudication:

• Chief Justice’s Administrative Control vs. Judicial Equality: Courts have drawn a line between the CJI’s administrative leadership and judicial decision-making. As the Supreme Court stated, “the administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice alone, but on the judicial side he is only the first among equals.”. This means that only the Chief Justice (and no other judge) can exercise control over case assignment, but once a bench is constituted and hearing a case, the Chief Justice’s opinion carries no extra weight – each judge is independent. This principle preserves both hierarchy (for administration) and equality (in adjudication).

• Obligation of Puisne Judges: Puisne (non-Chief) judges are required to hear the cases allotted to them and cannot choose cases on their own. Judicial discipline dictates that they must comply with the roster and bench composition set by the Chief Justice. A judge cannot say “I will only hear XYZ type of case” or swap cases with another bench without approval. For example, if the Chief Justice assigns Judge A to a criminal bench, Judge A shouldn’t unilaterally pick a pending constitutional case and start hearing it. In Prakash Chand, the Supreme Court strongly censured the High Court judge who tried to keep hearing a case that was removed from his roster – calling it “improper” and disruptive of judicial discipline.

• Bench Integrity – No Self-Reconstitution: Once the Chief Justice has determined a bench, the judges on that bench cannot reconstitute themselves or split up without authorization. For instance, two judges assigned to hear cases together cannot decide to sit separately in single benches on their own; nor can a single bench case be converted into a division bench by the judge without the Chief Justice’s nod. This rule prevents chaotic scenario where judges rearrange dockets to suit their preferences. The Supreme Court made this clear: if a roster says a judge sits singly, he cannot start hearing cases in a Division Bench format on his own (and vice versa).

• Tied-up and Part-heard Cases: Consistency in hearing is another facet of discipline. Courts follow the norm that a case “part-heard” by a bench should ordinarily be “tied up” with the same bench until disposal. This means if a matter has been partially heard (some arguments made) by Bench X, it should continue before Bench X on the next date, rather than going to a new bench that would have to rehear everything. This practice ensures efficiency and that judges are fully familiar with the case. Only the Chief Justice can intervene to shift a part-heard case to a different bench – usually for extraordinary reasons (e.g. a judge on Bench X is unavailable for a long time). Many High Court rules (and Supreme Court practice) reflect this: e.g., a High Court rule may say “a case partly heard by a Bench shall ordinarily be laid before the same Bench for disposal”, with a proviso that the Chief Justice may order otherwise if needed (such as if a case can’t be heard for over two months due to a judge’s absence).

• Coordinate Bench Decorum: A crucial discipline is that no Bench should interfere with or comment on matters being heard or decided by a coordinate Bench. Each bench operates within its assigned sphere. For example, if Bench A is hearing Case 1, another Bench B should not entertain a petition on the same subject in a way that conflicts with Bench A’s handling. Likewise, no bench should pass orders undermining another bench’s order. In the Rajasthan episode, the High Court judge not only grabbed a case from another bench but also made disparaging comments about that bench’s decision. The Supreme Court slammed this as acting without jurisdiction and “subversive of judicial discipline”. The takeaway: judges must respect each other’s turf as defined by the roster, and disputes over roster assignments are to be resolved only through the Chief Justice, not by judicial one-upmanship.

• Bench Strength Hierarchy: As noted earlier, the size of the bench matters for precedent. This is a self-imposed discipline to maintain consistency. A smaller bench is bound by the decisions of a larger bench, and if a coordinate bench (same size) finds a prior decision of equal strength wrong, it cannot overrule it – it must request the Chief Justice to form a larger bench. This rule (reiterated in the Dawoodi Bohra case) means judges follow a clear hierarchy in following past rulings. In roster terms, it is the Chief Justice who, upon such a request, will assign a larger bench to resolve the conflict. This practice prevents ad hoc overruling and ensures judicial propriety.

In essence, the Master of the Roster system is intertwined with maintaining orderly conduct within the judiciary. It is designed so that judges do not compete or interfere in hearing cases, and all know that the Chief’s word on roster is final. This hierarchical discipline is seen as vital for the integrity and credibility of the courts, because it averts internal conflicts (“hankering for a particular jurisdiction or case,” as one judgment warned) and presents a unified institutional front.

7. Recusal and Conflict of Interest in Roster Allocation

Recusal (when a judge opts out of hearing a case due to potential conflict of interest or bias) adds another layer to roster management. Here’s how recusals intersect with the Master of the Roster doctrine:

• Effect of a Judge’s Recusal: If any judge on a bench recuses from a case (say, the judge has a personal connection to a party, or had previously dealt with the case), that case cannot be heard by that bench and needs re-assignment. The Chief Justice, as MoR, will assign the case to a different bench or induct another judge as needed. For example, if a two-judge Bench is hearing a matter and one judge recuses, the CJI may either put a new judge on that bench to replace the recused judge, or list the case before an entirely new bench. The process is administrative: the Registry informs the CJI of the recusal, and the CJI issues necessary directions. This ensures the recusal (a safeguard for impartiality) does not lead to case stagnation – the CJI’s roster power is used to find a fair alternative bench.

• Chief Justice’s Own Recusal: A more delicate situation is when the Chief Justice themselves might have a conflict of interest in a case. Ordinarily, principles of natural justice dictate that the CJI should not hear or decide any case where there is even an appearance of bias or personal stake. In practice, if a case directly involves the CJI (for instance, an allegation against the CJI or a matter concerning the CJI’s administrative decisions), one would expect the CJI to recuse from the bench and also from administrative decision-making in that case. The convention in such scenarios is that the next senior-most judge (the next in line) steps in to assume the MoR role for that particular matter, ensuring an independent allocation of the case. This happened, for example, when past CJIs have been confronted with matters of their own alleged misbehavior – a committee of other judges handled the case.

   

  However, there is no formal rule forcing the CJI’s hand in recusal situations, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has sometimes prioritized the MoR principle even over recusal. In a 2018 controversy, when petitions questioned the CJI’s role in assigning a particular sensitive case (where his own conduct was indirectly questioned), a Constitution Bench responded that only the CJI could decide the roster, even for that case – effectively asserting that the authority of MoR stands even if the matter concerns the CJI. This stance drew criticism for seemingly violating nemo judex in causa sua. Critics argued – and continue to argue – that no one should be a judge in his own cause, and by extension, should not control the assignment of his own cause. The Court, on the other hand, feared that allowing exceptions could undermine the institutional mechanism.

• Managing Recusals Transparently: The Supreme Court has begun indicating on cause lists when a judge has recused from a matter, and has started to devise norms so that recusal does not become a means of “bench shopping.” For instance, if parties try to get a judge to recuse just to delay or to get a different bench, the CJI can recognize that pattern and may list the case before a bench that would carry on regardless of such tactics. Conversely, if many judges recuse from a sensitive case (e.g. one involving a colleague or a high-profile individual), the CJI may have to improvise – sometimes even bringing in retired judges or shifting the case to a different jurisdiction (though in the Supreme Court context, bringing an ad hoc judge is not common except via constitutional provision).

• Post-Recusal Reassignments: A practical note is that when the CJI recuses from hearing a case (for example, say a review petition where the CJI was part of the original bench, or a case involving the CJI’s family member), typically the matter would fall to the next senior judge to reassign. High Courts follow a similar approach: if the Chief Justice of a High Court recuses or is unavailable, usually the next senior judge handles roster changes in the interim.

In summary, recusals are a safety valve to ensure impartial justice, and the MoR system is flexible enough to accommodate them by re-routing cases to other benches. The challenge arises when the conflict involves the Chief Justice – because the very person who assigns cases may need to step aside. While legally the MoR power remains with the office of CJI, ethics and propriety often demand that a CJI yield that power to a neutral process in such instances. The judiciary is still evolving conventions for this – balancing the need to uphold nemo judex against maintaining the orderly roster structure.

 (Illustration: In the 2019 incident involving allegations against CJI Ranjan Gogoi, he initially took cognizance of the matter himself (raising eyebrows), but later a committee of other Supreme Court judges examined it. Commentators cited this as an example where the MoR power allowed the CJI to “constitute a bench presiding over his own cause”, highlighting the risks when recusal norms are not clearly followed.)*

8. Administrative Process of Roster Management

Understanding how the roster is actually managed in practice helps illustrate the MoR doctrine’s functioning:

• Roster Preparation: The process usually begins with the Chief Justice’s office drawing up a roster periodically (often when a new CJI takes charge, or every few months). The roster is essentially a chart or order specifying which Benches (by judge name) will hear which categories of cases. For example, it may say: Bench 1 (Chief Justice and Justice X) – hears Public Interest Litigations, Election matters, Constitutional Bench references; Bench 2 (Justice Y and Justice Z) – hears Criminal Appeals, etc. The CJI may consult senior judges in preparing this, but ultimately approves it. According to the Supreme Court’s procedures, the Registrar prepares the draft roster as directed by the CJI, and the final roster is issued under the CJI’s authority.

• Filing of Cases and Categorization: When a new case (petition, appeal, etc.) is filed in the Supreme Court, the Registry examines the subject-matter of the case. There are broadly 47 subject categories defined (such as civil matters, criminal matters, service (employment) matters, tax, land acquisition, etc.), each with numerous sub-categories. The Registry will classify a case under the appropriate category based on the relief sought and issues involved. This categorization is crucial because it determines which bench as per the roster will hear the case.

• Automated Allotment: With e-filing and computerization, much of this categorization and allotment is now aided by software. Once categorized, a case is automatically listed before the bench assigned to that category (or one of the benches, if multiple benches share the category) on the next available date. For instance, if two benches handle criminal cases, new criminal filings might be alternately assigned to each to balance the load.

• Publication of Roster and Cause List: The roster (bench-category assignment) is made public via the Supreme Court website and circulars to advocates. Then, for each working day, the Registry publishes a cause list – which specific cases each bench will take up that day. The cause list is prepared based on (a) the pending cases already part-heard or in queue before each bench, and (b) newly filed cases falling under each bench’s subject category. Urgent matters that have been allowed an early hearing by the CJI (through mentioning) are also added to the relevant bench’s list.

• Mentioning and Urgent Listings: Every morning, the Chief Justice’s court entertains “mentions” for urgent matters (unless the Supreme Court has made alternate arrangements). Lawyers requesting a hearing on short notice for a case (e.g., a stay on a government action, habeas corpus pleas, etc.) will mention it before the CJI (or the judge heading that day’s mentioning bench). The CJI then decides whether to grant an urgent listing and, if yes, on what date and before which bench. Often, if a case belongs to the CJI’s own bench category, the CJI may list it before his bench immediately or the next day. If it belongs to another category, he may direct the Registry to list it before the appropriate bench at the earliest. This is an administrative function but critical, as it can fast-track important cases. (Notably, CJI’s in 2023-25 introduced reforms like e-mentioning and specific time windows for mentioning, to streamline the process.)

• Registry’s Role: The Supreme Court’s Registry (headed by the Registrar General and other Registrars) is the engine that implements the roster. The Registrar’s duties include checking if filings are in order, figuring out if any case is connected to an earlier case (if yes, it often goes to the same bench that heard the earlier related case), and placing matters before the correct bench as per the roster. The Registrar is answerable to the Chief Justice in these tasks. If any confusion or novel issue arises (for example, a case doesn’t fit neatly into a category), the Registrar seeks the Chief Justice’s directions.

• Changes and Adjustments: If a judge is absent (leave, etc.) or if a bench has finished its list early, the Chief Justice can issue a supplementary roster or adjustment. Sometimes, special Benches are constituted for miscellaneous matters (like all admission hearings on Mondays and Fridays). The CJI also designates Vacation Benches during court recesses – again an aspect of roster power.

• E-filing and Monitoring: With the advent of e-filing, the entire life cycle of a case from filing to disposal can be monitored. The CJI’s office receives data on the pendency in each category and before each bench. This data-driven oversight allows the CJI to reallocate categories if one bench is overburdened. For instance, if Bench ‘A’ has a huge backlog of a certain category, the CJI might shift some sub-categories to Bench ‘B’ in an updated roster.

In practice, the goal is to have a stable, pre-announced roster so that there is less room for ad hoc decisions. Lawyers and litigants then know which bench is likely to hear their case (barring special orders). This predictability furthers fairness. The administrative process, therefore, reflects a balance: the CJI’s centralized supervision coupled with a bureaucratic machinery (Registry) that applies the roster rules to individual cases.

 (Administrative Example: The Supreme Court’s Listing Notices often outline new policies – such as a recent notice by the CJI (2025) that senior advocates should not get preference in oral mentioning, to democratize access to mentioning. This shows the CJI’s micro-management in how the roster and listing process operates, aimed at transparency and efficiency.)*

9. Comparative Insights: UK, US, and Canada

The concept of a “Master of the Roster” or equivalent administrative head exists in other jurisdictions too, though the structure of those judicial systems influences how roster power is exercised:

• United States: The U.S. Supreme Court (SCOTUS) has 9 Justices who always sit together “en banc” to hear cases (except in rare recusals). Thus, the U.S. Chief Justice (currently the Chief Justice of the United States) does not allocate different cases to different panels – all Justices hear all granted cases. The key power in the U.S. system is deciding which cases to accept for review (certiorari), and that is determined by the collective vote of the Justices, not solely by the Chief. Once a case is on the docket, every Justice participates by default, and a quorum of 6 is needed for decisions. Therefore, the American Chief Justice’s role as “master of roster” is minimal in terms of case allocation – he cannot choose which Justice hears a case (since all do). The Chief’s influence is seen more in presiding over proceedings and assigning the writing of opinions when in the majority. The U.S. model, with all judges hearing each case, avoids issues of roster manipulation but limits how many cases can be heard (SCOTUS hears only ~70-80 cases a year).

• United Kingdom: The UK Supreme Court has 12 Justices and typically sits in panels of 5 for most cases, sometimes 7 or 9 for very important cases. The President of the UK Supreme Court (equivalent to Chief Justice) does have a say in panel selection, but the process is relatively collegiate. Cases are in theory allocated on a roughly random or rotational basis, and by practice, either the President or Deputy President sits on most panels. If a case involves a specific area of law (say Scottish law or commercial law), Justices with expertise in that area may be selected for that panel. The UK system constrains choice: the small size of the court means every judge ends up hearing a substantial share of cases, and the presence of the President or Deputy in each panel ensures leadership oversight. There have been hardly any public controversies in the UK about bench-packing or roster misuse – likely because the stakes of ideological divergence are lower, and all panels are ultimately subsets of the same 12 judges. Essentially, the UK Supreme Court President is a master of roster in principle, but the room to skew outcomes by panel selection is limited by convention and the homogeneity of a small bench.

• Canada: The Supreme Court of Canada has 9 Justices, but unlike the US, it does not always sit en banc. It often sits in panels of 5 or 7 (and occasionally all 9) depending on the case’s importance. Here, the Chief Justice of Canada holds significant roster authority: he or she decides the size of the panel for each appeal and which judges will sit on it. By law, a minimum quorum of 5 is required, but the Chief can convene larger benches for major cases. According to official sources, the Chief Justice “oversees the work of the Court by designating the panels of judges to hear the cases”. This is very analogous to the Indian system: it is the Chief Justice who chooses, for example, that a particular case will be heard by 7 judges and picks those seven (perhaps ensuring regional representation, bilingual mix, etc., as Canada has requirements like at least 3 judges from Quebec on the Court). The potential for a Canadian Chief Justice to influence outcomes by choosing certain colleagues for a panel has been academically noted, but in practice Canadian Chiefs have maintained a high degree of integrity and such concerns have not manifested in open crisis. There is also a tradition of consensus-building, and many cases are heard by all 9 judges particularly if they are of great national importance, which mitigates the roster power issue.

(Other Jurisdictions: Many common law countries follow one of these models or a hybrid. For example, Australia’s High Court usually sits en banc (Full Court of 7) for important cases, so the Chief Justice’s roster role is limited. In South Africa, the Constitutional Court has a fixed bench of 11 that usually all sit together. In contrast, Pakistan’s Supreme Court (which, like India’s, operates in panels) has had its Chief Justices wield roster power similar to India, occasionally leading to controversy as well. Each system’s approach to bench composition reflects a trade-off between manageability of caseload and safeguarding against potential bias in panel selection.)*

 Comparison Summary: The Master of the Roster doctrine is not unique to India, but its implications are most pronounced in systems like India’s and Canada’s where not all judges sit together. In the US and similar courts where full benches hear every case, the issue largely doesn’t arise. The UK and Canada have internal conventions to ensure fairness in panel selection. India’s scenario is unique due to the Supreme Court’s heavy caseload and the wide discretion its Chief Justice enjoys in constituting innumerable 2- and 3-judge benches. This is why the MoR debate is more intense in India, making it a pertinent topic for governance and reform.

10. Relevance for Governance and Reform Debates

The “Master of the Roster” doctrine has significant implications for judicial governance, accountability, and the ongoing debate on institutional reforms in India. Key points of discussion include:

• Centralization of Power: The fact that so much power is concentrated in a single individual (the CJI) for case allocation has raised questions from a democratic perspective. Critics argue that vesting “unbridled” power in one person is “anathema to democracy”, especially in an institution meant to safeguard democratic values. They point out that absolute power can be misused – for example, a CJI might consciously or unconsciously assign cases to benches likely to yield a particular outcome (a practice that would undermine judicial impartiality). This centralization also makes the system reliant on the integrity of one office – a “single point of failure” if that integrity is in doubt.

• Transparency and Trust: For the judiciary to command public trust, its internal processes must appear fair. Opacity in roster decisions can lead to speculation about favoritism. The events of early 2018 (when four Supreme Court judges spoke out) clearly demonstrated that even the perception of bias in case assignment can shake the institution’s credibility. Thus, reform advocates call for more transparent and rule-bound criteria for roster decisions. Some suggest that written guidelines be laid down for the CJI to follow when assigning cases – for instance, objectively defining what makes a case “sensitive” and should go to a certain bench, rather than it being purely at the CJI’s discretion.

• Institutional Integrity vs. Executive Interference: One argument in favor of the current MoR system is that a strong CJI can act as a protective shield for the judiciary’s independence. Since the executive or external forces need to only influence one individual (the CJI) to affect case outcomes, this is actually seen as a vulnerability – “with the CJI as the sole Master of the Roster, any executive seeking to influence the Court needs only a pliant CJI”, as one commentary noted. This cuts both ways in debates: some say decentralizing the power (spreading it among a group of senior judges) would make it harder for external pressure to compromise the system; others fear that involving multiple judges could lead to internal conflicts or leaks, again weakening the judiciary. The correct balance is part of the reform discourse.

• Proposed Reforms – Collegium or Panel for Roster: A prominent proposal has been to take roster power away from a single individual and vest it in a small panel (like the Collegium of 5 senior judges). The idea is that the five senior-most judges could collectively decide bench assignments, which would introduce peer accountability and allay fears of one person’s bias. This was essentially what Shanti Bhushan’s petition sought. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this, noting that the Second Judges Case’s logic (which said important appointments shouldn’t be in one person’s hands) cannot be extrapolated to daily case listing. The Court said involving a Collegium for roster would be impractical for routine functioning. Nonetheless, the debate continues academically: proponents say a collective roster committee could set broad rosters, leaving routine listing to the Registry, thus maintaining efficiency but curbing arbitrary decisions. It would also distribute responsibility, so no single judge is blamed for controversial listings.

• Procedural Checks and Balances: Short of structural change, other suggestions aim to refine the current system:

  • Objective Criteria: Formulate clear criteria for sending cases to larger benches, or for marking a matter as urgent/sensitive and hence to be handled by particular judges.

  • Random Allocation: Use a computerized random allocation (within the limits of subject categories) to assign cases to judges, to remove even the perception of human bias. For example, if three benches handle service-law cases, new cases could be randomly assigned among them rather than the CJI picking a bench for each case. This reduces the scope for “bench-hunting”. Some have suggested that politically sensitive cases be automatically heard by the top five senior judges, and among those judges the specific case could be assigned by lottery. This would ensure both competence and randomness.

  • Consultative Approach: Even without a formal collegium, the CJI could consult two or three senior judges when deviating from the normal roster. Say a highly charged case comes in – the CJI might informally confer with fellow senior judges on who should hear it, creating a small check against unilateral decision. Adopting such internal conventions could go a long way.

  • Record and Review: Some have mooted that every order of the CJI on the administrative side (like transferring a case from one bench to another) should be briefly reasoned and recorded, and perhaps subject to review by a 2-judge administrative committee if someone objects. However, this is not in practice yet; it’s a theoretical check that could be explored.

• Recent Trends: Post-2018, the Supreme Court has indeed shown more openness. Rosters are published, and CJIs have been fairly regular in hearing long-pending Constitution Bench matters, indicating a conscious effort to avoid criticism of selective listing. The Court as an institution seems aware that its legitimacy partly rests on public perception that cases are assigned fairly and not “managed.” The press, public and even junior judges are more vocal now if something seems off. This environment itself acts as a moderating force on the MoR power.

• Ambedkar’s Warning and the Road Ahead: Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had cautioned during the Constituent Assembly debates that however high an office, its occupant is human, with human failings. The MoR controversy brings that warning to mind. Many commentators argue that relying solely on personal integrity is risky; instead, institutionalize the checks. For example, one editorial opined that the Master of the Roster “needs to be diversified beyond the CJI’s exclusive and untrammelled discretion.”. This could mean formal rules or a larger say for the full court in devising roster methodologies. On the other hand, some jurists feel the current system is fine as long as successive CJIs follow conventions scrupulously; they worry that formal rules could become rigid or be exploited in unforeseen ways.

In governance terms, the MoR doctrine highlights the tension between efficiency/centralization and accountability/transparency in public institutions. The debate is not about taking away the CJI’s role entirely – everyone agrees the judiciary cannot function by “committee” for every little decision. It is about calibrating the power: ensuring the Chief Justice’s immense administrative authority is exercised with accountability, fairness, and internal checks so that the judiciary’s integrity remains intact.

 For UPSC aspirants, the Master of the Roster issue is a prime example of how a seemingly internal court procedure can have broad implications for rule of law and separation of powers. It underlines the importance of institutional norms and how their evolution (or stagnation) can affect the quality of governance. Reforms in this area are part of the larger discourse on judicial reforms (like appointments, accountability, etc.), all aimed at enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of the judiciary as a pillar of democracy.